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PUNISHMENT SELECTION AS A FUNCTION OF BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
DOUGLAS W. KNIGHT*
Scores of unchallenged books and articles attest
to the emphatic social scientific and psychological
persuasion that the public's ancient willingness to
punish its criminals reflects quite more than an
engineering approach to the social defense. Emo-
tional need and latent social function are unques-
tionably served by the intricately systematized
formal and symbolic ostracism of the offender. But
how rigid is the punitive reaction?
Weihofen has asserted that rational understand-
ing of others' behavior promotes objectivity:
... If we will come to understand the moti-
vations that lie behind the way human beings
behave-wrongdoer and righteous both-we
shall be increasingly able to supplant an
emotionally charged, moralizing approach to
the problem of crime with a more scientific
emphasis on social dangerousness, deterra-
bility and treatability.1
Alexander and Staub years ago stressed that not
until the community's subterranean demand to
punish is made public-not until the community
knows itself-can it embark on a rational scheme
of criminal justice. Appreciating the offender's
situation, they have insisted, is a necessary but
not sufficient precursor to a scientific response to
him:
We may be very exact and go very deeply
into the study of, the personality of the crimi-
nal; we may use psychoanalysis to discover
the psychogenesis of a gi;ven crime, yet the
treatment of the criminal in the light of, and
with the consideration of, his unconscious
motivations will be met with a number of
great resistances, unless this treatment re-
mains at the same time in accordance with
the general affective demand for atonement
and reparation. Scientific insight will sooner
be thrown overboard than the gratification
of an emotional drive.2
* The author received a Master of Science degree in
Criminology at Fresno State College, Fresno, Cali-
fornia. During the past three years he has served as a
correctional officer at the California Men's Colony and
is presently serving in the same capacity at San Quentin
State Prison. EDIToR1 WXErorEN, TaE URGE To PuinH 146 (1956).
2 ALXmAzR & STAUB, THE CREmIMA., THE JUDGE,
AND TE PiBmic 212 (1956).
However, the fact is that as students of crimi-
nology have inclined to focus on crime itself, the
enormous variety of responses to it has not been
subject to systematic study. There is available
very little empirical evidence of the extent to
which the "urge to punish" is amenable to modifi-
cation.
The pilot investigation reported here questioned
whether respondents' knowing about the back-
ground-that is, life history-of a criminal would
lead to a decrease in the severity with which they
would want to punish him. Specifically, the ques-
tion was asked whether individuals who are
"forced" to consider biographical antecedents of a
criminal act (even if such consideration is super-
ficial) would hypothetically punish the agent of
behavior to a significantly lesser degree than would
individuals perusing only the action of the be-
havior, the crime.
In order to answer this exploratory question, a
post-test-only control group experimental design
was employed. A two-form schedule was devised
and a different form administered to each ran-
domized one-half of a random sample (N = 80)
of the public population of a small California com-
munity. Polled individually, the control subjects
responded to the Criminal Act form, the experi-
mental subjects to the Criminal Act-Biography
form. Both forms called for the respondent to
decide the just penalty (punishment) for ten de-
scribed crimes. On both forms the same ten hypo-
thetical crimes were described, and the same
multiple-choice punishment possibilities were
listed. The punishment scale, ranging from "No
Punishment" to 'Death," was comprised of eleven
approximately equal interval categories of par-
tially indeterminate "sentences" (as, "2-5 yrs.").
However, the difference between the forms, the
experimental variable, occurred in the extent of in-
formation provided about each criminal. For each
hypothetical crime, a three-quarter-page presenta-
tion of the facts relative to the commission of the
act was made available to the control group, with
data about the actor's past excluded. The experi-
mental respondents were introduced to a page (per
crime) of slightly less detailed information about
the act but which included about two paragraphs
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of implicit etiological information (which varied
from crime to crime). Essentially, then, control
group respondents judged criminal acts only, while
experimental group respondents evaluated com-
bined act-biography information.
For example, the control group act evaluators
were given the following information about the
embezzlement offense:
Arthur Allen, 35, was the rental manager of
a large equipment rental and supply company.
The company did heavy business with farmers
and ranchers, renting them farm machinery.
Allen, because of his trusted position, was able
to cheat the company out of nearly $8,000 in
3 years.
Not closely supervised, Allen would some-
times rent expensive machinery without enter-
ing the transaction on company records. Using
his own contracts, he could keep the cus-
tomer's money, and later audits would not
show that a rental had been made. However, a
chance comparison of rental records with post-
rental maintenance records revealed a dis-
crepancy. Old records were reviewed, the
$8,000 embezzlement was discovered, and
Allen was arrested.
By contrast, the experimental group act-
biography evaluators were furnished the following
information about the same case:
Arthur Allen grew up in a "well-to-do"
family of good social standing. However, the
father, the 2 sisters, and the boy-all intelli-
gent-were dominated by the mother. Even
before his teens Allen showed the same sub-
missive traits his father did, and like his
mother, had come to expect everything to
revolve around his own desires. He expected
much praise and reward. His mother often
argued on his behalf at school, sometimes in-
sisting that the boy be given special considera-
tions. She once had one of his B grades changed
to an A and boasted to the family of this.
She was proud, too, of her ability to evade a
certain amount of income tax and "get away
with it".
By age 35, Arthur Allen, married with 2
children, had worked up to the position of
rental manager of a large equipment company.
Still not able to live as luxuriously as he once
had, he began renting some farm equipment
on his own contracts, keeping the customers'
money, and not recording the transactions.
PUNISHMENT SCORE DATA FOR INDIVIDUAL CRIMES
Check forgery .........





Sale of narcotics .......
Forcible rape ..........
Armed robbery .........







































A t-ratio of 1.96+ is required for p < .05; 2.58+ for
p < .01.
** Significant at the .01 level.
* Significant at the .05 level.
He embezzled $8,000 in 3 years before a record
discrepancy led to his arrest.
Although the external validity of the findings is
open to question, the ten crimes (see the accom-
panying table) and ten condensed biographies were
designed to be reasonably varied and representa-
tive within the limits circumscribed by the short
schedule. The scope and magnitude of difference
between the Criminal Act form and the Criminal
Act-Biography form were held as constant as
possible for all hypothetical crimes.
For the purpose of gauging punishment severity
differences between the two groups, each penalty
choice was assigned a number value corresponding
to its rank on the eleven-point punishment scale.
(A "No Punishment" choice, for example, was
worth 1, whereas a "Death" selection was worth
11.) When a respondent's ten judgments were con-
verted into their numerical values, his total score
could thereby be obtained.
A comparison of the mean score of the control
group (48.00) with the mean score of the experi-
mental group (42.28) revealed that the severity of
punishment had decreased to a highly significant
extent (t = 2.68, p < .01) concomitant with bio-
graphical information about the offenders.
The table depicts the comparative mean penalty
scores for each of the ten judged crimes. From this
breakdown it is evident that although the experi-
mental group mean scores were lower (signifying
less harsh penalty choices) for eight of the ten
(Vol. 56
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judgments, these differences were significant (p <
.05) in but three instances. However, the trend is
distinct; for six of the eight crimes for which ex-
perimental raters' scores were found to be lower,
the derived t-scores were at least moderately high.
The only crimes punished more severely by those
respondents evaluating biographical information
were grand theft, automobile and assault with a
deadly weapon. These differences were significant
and thus plainly extraordinary in view of the modal
tendency for knowledge of the criminals' pasts to
accompany a reduction in punishment. The com-
bined crimes mean punishment score difference
would have been even greater, of course, had these
two offenses been excluded from judgment. The
investigator would offer that the deviant tendency
for respondents to judge the automobile thief and
the assaulter more punitively as they knew more
about them might suggest that the experimental
group conceived of the acts as characteristic of the
actors, whereas, when examined without benefit of
knowledge about the offender, these crimes bore
the mark of situational precipitation.
Despite, then, the observation that ascribed
punishments tend to become less severe in associa-
tion with judges' learning about the criminals'
pasts, there were variations which are indicative of
the importance to the study of the kinds of bio-
graphical material and crimes employed. In this
regard, an examination may be made of the order-
ing of the crimes according to the severity with
which they were punished by each group. Tenta-
3 Conceivably, control respondents perceived that
the thief had merely ".. . wandered around until find-
ing a late model car," while biographical data disclosed
his characteristic instability. Similarly, control re-
spondents knew only that the assaulter had become
involved in a fight and that when he . .. was knocked
down, he pulled a knife...."
tively adopting the Sellin-Wolfgang scale of crime
seriousness as a "normative" index,4 we may take
rough note of the variable impact of the specific
biographical information provided to the experi-
mental group: the rank order correlation between
inferred act evaluators' rankings and the same of-
fenses ordered according to Sellin-Wolfgang
weightings is .89, while inferred act-biography
evaluators' rankings correlated only .58 with the
Sellin-Wolfgang standardized rankings. 5
Although these classes of variables thwart gener-
alizability, there can be no doubt that, under the
relatively uncomplex conditions specified, "puni-
tive justice" was readily manipulated. Further
inquiry should aim at ferreting out the more subtle
variables which influence this species of sanctioned
aggression. The results of this small exploratory
experiment suggest that our ability to perceive the
link between a criminal's present and past may
have notable bearing on our attitude toward him.
The "urge to punish" notwithstanding, related
research may yield strategies for constructive
attitude change in "non-professional" correctional
workers, as well as provide techniques of public
education essential to the promotion of specific
correctional programs.
4 See SxIu.N & WOIGANG, THE MxAsuar i OF
DELINQUENCY, (1964). The authors' scale is a rigorously
evolved but manageable index sufficiently refined as to
permit a weighting of the components and aggravating
factors of each offense in a range of criminal acts. Al-
though derived from a study of a Philadelphia sample,
the scale has a hopefully wider validity. "It is doubtful,"
the authors have suggested, "... that regional varia-
tions in the United States would significantly alter the
proposed index or the relative scale values." Ibid. 332.
5 Two of the crimes-indecent exposure and sale of
narcotics-could not be treated by the Sellin-Wolfgang
scoring system and were thus excluded from the cor-
relations.
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